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CASENOTES

No Exclusion for ADEA Claims Under
I.R.C. § 104(a)(2): An Analysis of
Commissioner v. Schleier

In order to resolve inconsistent conclusions between the courts of
appeals as to the taxability of damages received under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Commissioner v. Schleier.' After
receiving damages in an ADEA settlement with United Airlines, Inc.,
Erich Schleier included as gross income the back pay portion of the
settlement, but excluded the portion of the settlement attributed to
liquidated damages on his 1986 federal income tax return.' The Tax
Commissioner issued a deficiency notice, claiming Schleier should have
included the liquidated damages as gross income? Schleier responded
by initiating proceedings in Tax Court claiming that he had properly
excluded the liquidated damages.4 In addition, Schleier sought a refund
of the taxes paid on the back pay portion of the settlement.5 The Tax
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Court agreed with Schleier, holding that the entire settlement satisfied
the requirement of "damages received ... on account of personal injury
or sickness" within the meaning of section 104(a)(2) of the Internal
Revenue Code and was, therefore, excludable from gross income.6 The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.7 The United States Supreme
Court reversed the Tax Court and the court of appeals, holding that
recovery under ADEA was not excludable from gross income.'
The exclusion from gross income of damages received on account of
personal injury was first codified in section 213(b)(6) of the Revenue Act
of 1918.s Later, Congress enacted the modem version of the personal
injury exclusion, section 104(a)(2) of the 1954 Code.'0 In 1960 the
Internal Revenue Service issued regulations that defined the phrase
"damages received (whether by suit or agreement)" to mean amounts
linked to actions based on tort or tort type rights." Against these
narrowly construed codified exclusions to gross income, section 61(a)
broadly provides that gross income includes "all income from whatever
source derived." 2 The Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Glenshaw
Glass"3 expanded the concept of gross income to include all "accessions
to wealth, clearly realized, over which the taxpayers have complete
dominion."' 4 The Tax Court applied these prior interpretations in
Threlkeld v. Commissioner 5 and developed a test for determining
6. Id.
7. Id. at 2162-63. (Relying on prior circuit decisions and the United States Supreme
Court decision in United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992), the Fifth Circuit affirmed.
1994)).
26.8.
F.3d 115
1119S. (5th
Ct. Cir.
at 2163. The court's reasoning was based on the plain language
of
section 104(a), the text of the regulation implementing section 104(a)(2), and the Court's
reasoning in Burke.
9. I.R.C. § 213(b)(6) (1918) provided for the exclusion of'[almounts received, through
accident or health insurance or under workmen's compensation acts, as compensation for
personal injuries or sickness, plus the amount of any damages received whether by suit or
agreement on account of such injuries or sickness."
10. Section 104(aX2) provided in part that gross income does not include: "the amount
of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or as
periodic payments) on account of personal injuries .... " I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1954). This
portion of the statute remained unchanged after Congress' 1989 amendment of section
104(a)(2).
11. The applicable regulation provided: "The term 'damages received (whether by suit
or agreement)' means an amount received (other than workmen's compensation) through
prosecution of a legal suit or action based upon tort or tort type rights, or through a
settlement agreement entered into in lieu of such prosecution." 25 Fed. Reg. 11, 490
(1960); 26 C.F.R. § 1.104-1(c) (1991).
12. I.R.C. § 61(a) (1986).
13. 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
14. Id. at 431.
15. 87 T.C. 1294 (1986), affd, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988).
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whether damages received from a lawsuit were excludable under section
104(a)(2). 6 The Court concluded that the "origin and character of the
claim" determined whether the damages received from a lawsuit were
excludable.1" The Court held that "[e]xclusion under section 104 will
be appropriate if compensatory damages are received on account of any
invasion of the rights that an individual is granted by virtue of being a
person in the sight of the law.""8 Following this expansive "nature of
the claim" test, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
in Rickel v. Commissioner,' reversed the Tax Court, in part, holding
that section 104(a)(2) excluded all damages received by the taxpayer on
account of age discrimination from gross income.20 The Tax Court had
held that the liquidated portion of the award was excludable, but that
the wage-related damages were based in contracts and therefore not
excludable. 2 The Third Circuit stated that "once it found that age
discrimination was analogous to a personal injury and that the
taxpayer's ADEA action amounted to the assertion of a tort type right,
the Tax Court should have ended its analysis."' Likewise, in Pistillo
v. Commissioner,28 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit reversed a Tax Court decision and held that section 104(a)(2)
excluded the entire settlement from gross income.2 4 Subsequently, in
Downey v. Commissioner,2' a case involving a settlement award to a
United Airlines pilot, the Tax Court overruled its holdings in Rickel and
Pistillo and held that section 104(a)(2) excluded both liquidated and
nonliquidated damages from gross income.26 In reaching its decision,
the Tax Court stated that the nature of the underlying claim, rather
than the claim's consequences, determines excludability, and the Tax
Court articulated a two-part test requiring that (1) the claim is tort or
tort-like and (2) the nature of the injury is personal.2 ' The Tax Court
applied this test and concluded that ADEA claims are tort-like and that

16. 87 T.C. at 1299.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1308.
19. 900 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1990).
20. Id. at 664.
21. 92 T.C. 510, 522 (1989), affd in part, reu'd in part, 900 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1990).
22. Rickel, 900 F.2d at 661.
23. 912 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1990).
24. Id. at 148.
25. 97 T.C. 150 (1991), opinion supplemented on reconsideration,100 T.C. 634 (1993),
reu'd, 33 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1994).
26. 97 T.C. at 173.
27. Id. at 161.
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age discrimination is a personal injury for purposes of section 104(a)(2).' Thus, the Tax Court found both the liquidated and nonliquidated
damages excludable.29 However, the Supreme Court in United States
v. Burke,30 a non-ADEA claim settlement, held that back pay awards
in settlement of pre-1991 Title VII claims are not excludable from gross
income under section 104(a)(2). 3' The Court focused its analysis on
what constitutes a tort and reasoned that the availability of a broad
range of damages was a critical factor in determining that a claim was
tort-like. 32 The Court found that pre-1991 Title VII remedies were
limited to back pay, injunctions, and equitable relief; in stark contrast
to those available under traditional tort law.33 Based on the Supreme
Court's decision in Burke, the Tax Court reconsidered its decision in
Downey and reaffirmed its earlier holding. 4 The Tax Court distinguished pre-1991 Title VII claims by arguing that the ADEA offered a
broad range of remedies including back pay and liquidated damages.3 6
After the Tax Court appeared to firmly establish its position on ADEA
recoveries, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
reversed the Tax Court in Downey and held that section 104(a)(2) does
not exclude settlements resulting from ADEA actions because the
damages do not compensate the taxpayer for those intangible elements
of injury essential to personal injury tort actions.36 In reaching its
decision, the Seventh Circuit limited its analysis to the approach taken
in Burke as the most pertinent teaching on the matter, ignoring previous
In contrast, the United States Court of
circuit court decisions.
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Schmitz v. Commissioner,38 a case
almost factually identical to Downey, held that section 104(a)(2) excluded
ADEA damages because the ADEA creates a tort-like cause of action.39
The court in Schmitz distinguished Burke because, unlike the pre-1991
version of Title VII, the ADEA provides for jury trials and liquidated

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
1994).
35.
36.
(1995).
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 165.
Id.
504 U.S. 229 (1992).
Id. at 242.
Id. at 235-37.
Id. at 238.
Downey v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 634, 637 (1993), rev'd, 33 F.3d 836 (7th Cir.
100 T.C. at 637.
Downey v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 836, 840 (1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2576
33 F.3d at 838.
34 F.3d 790 (1994), cert. granted andjudgment vacated, 115 S. Ct. 2573 (1995).
34 F.3d at 796.
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damages.' The Ninth Circuit also noted that case law and legislative
history indicate that ADEA liquidated damages have a compensatory as
well as a punitive purpose. 4'
In Commissioner v. Schleier,42 the United States Supreme Court
settled these inconsistencies between the Courts of Appeals, holding that
damages received under the ADEA are not excludable from gross income
under section 104(a)(2).4' The Court framed its discussion by emphasizing the "sweeping scope" of 26 U.S.C. § 61(a)'s definition of gross
income as construed by Glenshaw Glass.' The Court then buttressed
section 61(a)'s broad construction by emphasizing the "default rule of
statutory interpretation that exclusions from income must be narrowly
construed." 5 The Court first analyzed the "plain language" of the
statute by considering a typical recovery in a personal injury case to
illustrate the usual meaning of "on account of personal injury."' The
Court used an automobile accident hypothetical to illustrate the reason
an accident victim's settlement-consisting of medical expenses; lost
wages; and pain, suffering, and emotional distress-would be excluded
under section 104(a)(2). 47 The Court reasoned that each element of the
settlement must be excludable not simply because the taxpayer received
a tort settlement, but because each element satisfied the "plain
language" of section 104(a)(2) requiring that damages be received "on
account of personal injuries or sickness."8 Initially, the Court distinguished Schleier's settlement, reasoning that neither him reaching age
sixty nor his
being laid off can be described as a "personal injury" or
"sickness." 9 Thus, the back wages portion of the settlement did not
satisfy the "on account of personal injuries or sickness" requirement.50
Next, the Court stated that although the taxpayer's unlawful termination may have caused some psychological or personal injury analogous
to pain and suffering caused by an automobile accident, no portion of the
recovery of back wages was attributable to that injury.5 Therefore,
section 104(a)(2) does not provide for the exclusion of Schleier's back

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 792-93.
Id. at 793.
115 S. Ct. at 2167.
Id.
Id. at 2163.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2163-64.
Id. at 2164.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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wages because the recovery was not "on account of" any personal injury
and because no personal injury affected the amount of back wages received. 2 Schleier further argued that in any event the liquidated
damages portion of his settlement was excludable under the plain
language of section 104(a)(2).5" Schleier contended that the liquidated
damages under the ADEA served to compensate plaintiffs for personal
injuries that are difficult to quantify.54 However, the Court quickly
dismissed this argument relying on its holding in Trans World Airlines,
6
where it held that "Congress intended for liquidated
Inc. v. Thurston,"
damages to be punitive in nature" for recoveries under the ADEA.'
Thus, the liquidated damages under the ADEA are not received "on
account of personal injury or sickness." 7 The Court then addressed
Schleier's argument that section 1.104-1(c) of the Treasury Regulations
only requires that the amount be received as a result of an action "based
upon tort or tort type rights." 8 Even accepting Schleier's characterization of the present action as tort type, the Court stated that the
regulatory requirement of a tort type action was no substitute for the
statutory requirement that the amount be receive "on account of
personal injuries or sickness", but it was instead an additional requirement.59 The Court recognized that the Commissioner had previously
interpreted the regulation as requiring only a tort type action, but such
interpretation was not given any special deference due to inconsistencies
in the Commissioner's opinion.' Finally, the Court analyzed Schleier's
case under its decision in Burke and found that Schleier's recovery was
not excludable for two reasons.6 First, Schleier's recovery was not
"based upon tort or tort type rights" as construed in Burke.6" The
Court agreed that it had emphasized the lack of a right to a jury trial
and the absence of any provision for punitive damages as factors
distinguishing pre-1991 Title VII action from traditional tort actions.'
However, the Court stated that it did not indicate that the presence of
either or both of these factors would be sufficient to bring a statutory

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id.
Id.
Id.
469 U.S. 111, 125 (1985).
115 S. Ct. at 2165.
Id.
Id. at 2165-66.
Id. at 2166.
Id. at 2166 n.7.
Id. at 2166.
Id.
Id.
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64
claim within the regulatory meaning of tort or tort type rights.
Second, the Court narrowed the holding in Burke to address only the
determination of whether the underlying action is "based upon tort or
tort type rights."65 The Court asserted that it did not hold that the
inquiry into tort or tort type rights constituted the beginning and the
In conclusion, the Court held that the plain
end of the analysis.6
language of section 104(a)(2) and its holding in Burke established two
independent requirements for a recovery to be excluded under section
104(a)(2).6 7 First, the underlying cause of action must be "based upon
tort or tort type rights."" Second, the taxpayer must show that the
any damages to be excluded were received "on account of personal
injuries or sickness." 9 The Court held that Schleier failed to satisfy
either requirement, and therefore neither the back wages nor liquidated
damages were excludable under section 104(a)(2)."
Although a departure from the generally consistent lower court
decisions providing that ADEA recoveries are excludable and arguably
a departure from the Court's reasoning in Burke, the Court's decision in
Schleier represents a reasonable interpretation of section 104(a)(2).
However, many questions remain as to how narrow the section 104(a)(2)
exclusion is after Schleier's interpretation of Burke and the added
scrutiny of the "on account of personal injuries" requirement. Applying
the Court's decision to antidiscriminatory statutes, this uncertainty
appears to require a close fact-based analysis of not only each statute
providing recovery for illegal discrimination, but also each claim under
the statute. While a claim may be sufficiently tort-like, each element of
that claim must also be on account of personal injury. Also, as Justice
O'Connor noted, under the majority's automobile accident hypothetical,
a taxpayer will have difficulty showing the causal relationship required
in the case of nonphysical personal injury. 71 In effect, a nonphysical
injury would have to rise to the level of a physical injury preventing the
taxpayer from going to work to make back wages excludable. Finally,
punitive damages will probably not satisfy the on-account-of-personalinjury requirement under the majority's analysis. Suprisingly, even in
the majority's car crash hypothetical, punitive damages would arguably

64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
Id. at 2167.
Id.
Id.

68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 2169 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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be received on account of the punishment of the negligent party and not
on account of personal injury and therefore would not be excludable.
Legislative action is needed to either support the narrow allowance of
section 104(a)(2) exclusions defined by the Court in Schleier or to
redefine the exclusions intended by Congress.
T. MARK SANDIFER

